ticular way, and it is claimed that this thing -law, for example-can only be explained by reference to the intrinsic normativity of the legal. A parallel account is given which describes the same empirical facts, usually without the problematic normative language of the first description, and explains them without reference to intrinsic normativity. The first description requires a mysterious thing -mysterious because it is outside the realm of ordinary explanation. The second does not.
When we live in a society we use a common set of ideas that enables coordination, assessing blame, and all sorts of other activities. These ideas are not good explanatory accounts: they typically involve fictions, ideas that don't fit with science, dubious entities, and so on. Moreover, they vary from society to society. Call these Good Bad Theories: they are good for the myriad purposes of coordination they serve, bad as science or explanation. Much normativism trades on taking the Good Bad Theories of our own society as expressing some sort of normative reality.
But there is a problem of reflexivity for normativism. Take the example of Mauss's discussion of gift exchange among the Maori. The Maori have a standard Good Bad Theory: they believe that a force, hau, attaches to a gift, and must be expiated by the giving of another gift in return. Even the most committed normativist would agree that there is no such thing as hau, and that the practice is sustained by the belief in hau, not by the force of hau. But what about the appeal to hau-like forces that is characteristic of normativism? Why aren't these better (and sufficiently) explained by the belief in them, such as the belief in legality, rather than the normative fact or property of legality?
These are the simple questions. No one is compelled to believe in hau. The tough ones come with things that we supposedly cannot reject: rationality, concepts, and so forth. Here the tu quoque arguments seem compelling. But here we are also dealing with abstracta, not concrete pieces of social action or problems of understanding others. So we have the same problem as before: there are parallel accounts, some with "normative" concepts, or concepts that can be construed as such, and some alternatives which dispense with at least some aspects of normativity, or construe the concepts differently.
And there is another issue with this parallelism: these abstracta need to be brought into contact with the world of actual human beings. So there has to be a component of explanations involving these abstracta that has to do with such things as learning, mental habituation, the formation of dispositions to reason in certain ways, and so forth. Similarly for 'understanding', one can claim that something, such as possessing the same concepts, is a condition of understanding, but there is still the activity of understanding itself. The question this raises is whether the naturalistic part of these explanations is sufficient to account for the phenomenon in question, without the "normative" part.
Here philosophy and social theory intersect at the same explanatory problem. Normativism attempts to ground normativity in some "natural" collective facts, such as social reactions or collective intentions. These are not only questionable notions, they are bad in ways familiar to social theorists from the long history of failed collective concepts. An interactionist approach avoids these problems. And it seems that a suitable account of such things as understanding can also be constructed "naturalistically" with the help of recent neuroscience and the discovery of mirror neurons. Mirror neurons allow a kind of understanding of actions and intentions that is preconceptual. These modes of understanding can be extended to encompass everything that was explained by normative abstracta.
